Canada Must Reclaim its Nuclear Judgement

Based on an Toronto Star op ed July 28

Canada’s nuclear story has always been one of choice. In 1946, with Hiroshima still smouldering, Canada could have become a nuclear weapons state. It had the uranium, the scientific expertise, the industrial base, and the wartime experience to do so. Instead, the St. Laurent government chose a different path, pressing for international control of nuclear arms while directing Canadian nuclear power toward civilian ends. That was judgment, not weakness.

That decision helped establish Canada’s reputation as a country committed to non-proliferation and restraint. But over time, that tradition has weakened. Today Canada speaks firmly against adversaries, grows cautious with allies, and too often falls silent when principle would require risk.

Consider NATO. In 1998, Parliament did not simply accept the government’s position on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. It held hearings across the country, listening to Canadians, experts, and international voices. The result was a serious democratic examination of nuclear dependence, and Parliament pressed NATO to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world.

That kind of scrutiny has faded. Canada remains outside the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and hovers at the margins of disarmament diplomacy. It supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but often in ways that preserve the system rather than challenge its contradictions. Canada speaks as if the nuclear order is stable, even as norms weaken and arsenals grow.

Which brings us to today. The United States and Saudi Arabia have reached a civil nuclear agreement that would allow Saudi Arabia to build reactors using American technology and, according to reporting, to enrich uranium as well. That is exactly the kind of capability that raises proliferation concerns. At the same time, Washington has used military force against Iran’s nuclear program, reinforcing a message that restraint is demanded of some while relaxed for others when strategic interests intervene.

Canada has said almost nothing. That silence is not neutrality. If enrichment is too dangerous for Iran, it is too dangerous for Saudi Arabia. If latent weapons capacity is unacceptable in one context, it cannot be tolerated in another simply because the recipient is a partner.

Canada also knows from experience how quickly peaceful nuclear cooperation can become strategically dangerous. After India’s 1974 nuclear test, which relied in part on plutonium from Canadian-supplied technology, Canada strengthened its safeguards and export controls. That episode remains a warning: intent can change, safeguards can erode, and today’s partner can become tomorrow’s proliferator.

A serious Canadian response would begin with one simple standard: civilian nuclear cooperation must be judged by the same rules everywhere. That means strong safeguards, intrusive verification, and full transparency. It also means Canada should launch a new parliamentary inquiry into nuclear policy, because the world has changed. Nuclear rivalry is back, arms control is fraying, and civilian nuclear deals are again becoming vehicles for strategic ambiguity.

Canada does not need to abandon its alliances to recover its voice. It needs to recover its judgment. The country that once chose not to become a nuclear weapons state should not now stand silent while others normalize nuclear pathways under the banner of peaceful use. Parliament should help it reclaim that standard.